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IN TH\E SUPREME COURT
of the
STAT'E OF ~uTAH
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,BERNICE CULLEY, Executrix
a
the Estate of VIRGIL J. 'CULrLE:Yt
B :.,.,. """"'
,· deeeased,
.
. AUG 3 (J 1965 .
Plaintiff and- Respondent,
-, _· '\
--- --- -0~-~-.l:·-,-~~;~-~-~~ e:-~~z-t: -~t~h---·
vs.
GAR FIE, L D S.MELTE~RME·N'S
CREDIT UNION; S. ~L. LES.T'E·R,
·-p~esident; GLE,N M. JONE,S, ViceNo. 10247
President; AL RO·BINSO·N, T'reasurer,
UNIVERSITY Cf UTAt-t
Defeniloots, ,
vs.
DOUGLAS K. ~CULLEY,
OCT 1 5 1boS
Interpleading Plaintiff and .;
Appellant, ·4
LAW LJ~RAR.'(
No. 10247
\
,
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APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN S,UPPORT OF
PE·TITION F'OR RE·HEARING
Appeal from judgment in favor of Plaintiff, holding that
a joint account in credit union belonged to deceased estate, and not to surviving joint tenant. Judgment entered
after trial wit4out jury, before the Honorable A. H.
Ellett, at ~alt Lake City, Utah, in Third Judicial District
c·ourt, Septemb,er 8, 1964.
A. H. ELLETT, Judge
ROY F. TYGESEN
2968 So. 8650 West
Magna, Utah, P.O. Box 206
297-6711

Attorney for Interpleading
Plaintiff and Appellant

MARK S. MINER
816 Newho~ Building,
.· ',)j . ,
Salt Lake C1ty, Utah ·
·/
.·
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent.
(Case d.jsmissed as to Defendants in lower court)
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of the

STATE OF UTAH
BERNICE CULLEY, Executrix of
the Estate of VIR;GIL J. ·CULLEY,
deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
GAR F I E L D S.MELTERME·N'S
CREDIT UNION; S. :L. LES.T'ER,
President; GLEN M. JONES, VicePresident; AL RO·BINSON, Treasurer,

No. 10247

Defenda;nts,

vs.
DOUGLAS K. ·CULLEY,
Interpleading Plaintiff and
Ap;p.ellant,

No. 102·47
APP'ELLANT'S BRIEF IN S·UPPORT OF
PETITION F:OR REHEARING
Appeal from judgment in favor of Plaintiff, holding tha.t
a joint account in credit union belonged to deceased estate, and not to surviving joint tenant. Judgment entered
after trial without jury, before the Honorable A. H.
Ellett, at Salt Lake City, Utah, in Third Judicial District
c·ourt, September 8, 1964.
A. H. ELLETT, Judge

MARK S. MINER

ROY F. TYGESEN
2968 So. 8650 West
Magna, Utah, P.O. Box 206
297-6711
Attorney for Interpleading
Plaintiff and Appellant

816 Newhouse Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent.
(Case dismissed as to Defendants in lower court)
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iN 'THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF U'TAH
BERNI·CE CULLEY, Executrix of
the Estate of VIRGIL J. CULLEY,
deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
GAR F I E L D SMELTERMEN'S
CREDIT UNION; S. L. LEST·ER,
Ptesident; GLEN l\I. l'JONES, VicePresident; AL RO·BINS·ON, T·reasurer,
Defendants,
'
vs.
DOUGLAS K. CULLEY,
Interpleading Plaintiff and
Appellant,

No. 10247

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Comes now the above named DOUGLAS K. CULLEY, Appellant and inter-Pleading Plaintiff, and P'etitions the Court for a rehearing in the above entitled
Inatter, and in support thereof, represents that this ·Court
erred, in the following:
1. The lower Court held that (A) "That at no tiine
did Virgil J. ·Culley (Deceased) intend that. Douglas
Culley was to have said account or any part thereof
during the life time of Virgil J. Culley and that Virgil
J. Culley never intended to make a gift of the rnoney

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

during his life tin1e to Douglas K. CullP~~, thP intPrPleading Plaintiff"; That there was no joint tenane~·
intended and no joint tenancy created by reason of the
joint share agreement; (B) The joint share agree1nent
\Vas signed as a substitute for a will.
In its conclusions of la\v, the lower Court held that
the joint share agreement was a testamentary device and
as such violates the statutes of \Vilis.
This 'Court confirms those findings, and that it was
a testamentary disposition.
Since every joint account provides for survivor~
ship, then under this Courts decision, every joint account is void.
2. The principal that a presumption exists in favor
of the validity of the joint share agreement, that can
be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence, is
entirely abandoned under the present decision.
3. The Court points out that the failure of appellant to exercise control over the account in the lifetime
of his father, nor to \vithdra\v or deposit to the .Account,
is the type of proof necessary to support that Findings
of the lower Court that the joint share agreement is
void. This reverses for1ner rulings of this Court, wherein this Court held that a \vithdrawal was an indication
of the opposite intent.
4. This decision in effects hold (A) \vhere no control is exercised; (B) Where surviving joint owner had
no intt>nt to control the account in the lifetime of depositor ; · ('C) there \vas no intent on the part of depositor
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to create a joint account, by reason of the conduct of
survivor. In other 'vords, the conduct of survivor. In
other vvords, the conduct of survivor determines the
intent of depositor.
5. The foregoing facts apply to practically every
such account, and 'Yould 111ake every joint account
vunerable to attack.

6. The present decision in effects voids the joint
account practice used in business over a long period of
time.
7. This decision opens the field to voluminous litigations and probate proceedings.
Respectfully submitted August 16, 1965.
Roy F. Tygesen - Attorney for
Petitioner and Appellant Douglas K. Culley.
29·68 South 8650 West, 1lagna, l itah
P. 0. Box 206- Dial 297-6711
I certify thata a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to MARK S. ~fiNER., Attorney at
Law, 816 Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah,
August 16, 1965.
Roy F. Tygesen
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iN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
B~~RNICE ClTLI~EY,

Executrix of
the Estate of '{IRGIL J. CULLEY,
deceased,
Plaintiff aJZd Respondent,
vs.
GAR F I E L D SMELTERMEN'S
CREDIT tJNION; S. L. LEST·ER,
President; GJ__JEN 1vL JONES, VicePresident; AL R.O·BINSON, Treasurer,
Defendants,
vs.

No. 10247

DOUGLAS I{. CULLEY,
Interpleading Plaintiff and
Appellant,
No. 10247
PETITION FOR REHEARING
DISPOSITION MADE IN LO\VER COuRT AND
BY THIS ·COURT ON APPEAL.
Appellant's original brief set out disposition in
lo,ver Court, and this ·Court affirrned; This petition for
rehearing by Douglas K. Culley, Appellant follows.
STATEMENT OF i\IATERIAL

FACT~S

This rnatter involves the deceased father, VIRGIL
J. CLTLLEY; BERNI'CE CULLEY; the surviving wife
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2
and Executrix of his Estate~, Plaintiff and R.Pspondt•nt
herein; THE GARFIEI_JD S}.TEijTER.:JIEN'N CHJ<~DI1,
lJNION, defendant in the action; and DOUGLAS K.
C-ULLEY, surviving joint o\vner of the account, the
Interpleading Plaintiff, Appellant, and petitioner for
rehearing. For the sake of brevity, ·riRGIL J. ClTLLEY, \vill be referred to as "the Father''; BERNICE
CULLEY, as '•Stepmother" and the (}ARFIELD
SMELTERMEN'S C RED I T UNION, as "'Credit
Union"; and DOl--:-GLAS K. CUL,LEY as "the son."
In 19·60, the father, was a vvidovver, his -vvife having
died, leaving four sons and a daughter, all of whom
were minors, except Douglas, the oldest son, who was
1narried and maintained his own home in Magna, Utah.
At the time the account \Yas created, the three
brothers lived \vith hin1, and the sister lived with her
maternal grandparents. The father lived separate and
apart from the fan1ily, and contributed practically nothing to their support.
The joint account was set up ~larch 10, 1960. At
the time, and up to his death, the father \Yas employed
by the Smelter as foreman, and had been a member of
the Credit Union for years.
The father had an account ,,~i th the credit union.
He obtained from the credit union their for1n entitled
HJOIN·T SHARE A·C'COlTNT _A_GR.EE~IENT," \Yent to
thP holnP of the son, both signed the agreen1ent, and
thP fath(_ l' delivPred the agree1nent to the Credit l~nion,
1
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3
·where it remained unchanged, until deposited 'vith the
Court.
The agreement was in usual for1n, prepared by the
Credit Union, providing (1) joint o\vnership with right
of survivorship, (2) right of either party to deposit or
"rithdraw, (3) and giving the Credit Union the right,
·with immunity frorn claim, to pay to either joint owner
or the survivor.
The father remarried, Bernice :c·ulley, sorne two
years prior to his death, October 10, 19·63.
On September 21, 1963, the father made a will, less
than a month before his death, giving his entire estate
to the step rnother, and specifically giving his children
nothing. The Will made no. mention of the saving account with the ·Credit Union.
There were no children issue of the second marriage.
Under the lower Court decision, the savings account
was a\varded to the estate, and of course under the Will,
would go to the stepn1other.
From the time of setting up the joint account till
shortly before his death, the father made deposits and
withdrawals from the savings account.
Douglas K. Culley, the son, never 1nade a deposit
or withdrawal, and in no way exercised control of the
account.
The father repeatedly discussed the account with
the son, and on one occasion said, He (the son) was to
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4
see that the boys \Vere provided and taken
(Respondents brief page 5-6-7).

care~

of''

The step-mother stated that the father repeatedly
promised her he would change the account, and 1nade a
trip to the Smelter to do so.
He never changed the account.
After the fathers death, the step-n1other instituted
probate proceedings and instituted this action, as Executrix of his estate.
The ·Credit Union deposited the savings account into
Court, together with copies of their records.
There vvere extended pleading, motions, and orders,
but finally the ~c·ourt made his "Findings of Fact" that
there was no joint tenancy, there was no intent to create
a joint tenancy, and the joint share agreement was
signed and made for the sole purpose of being used as
a substitute for a will.
Further, under the undisputed testi1nony of Douglas K. 'Culley, the joint share agree1nent violates the
statute of wills, and was an attempted testa1nentary
devise.
In its conclusions, the Court ruled that the joint
share agreement was an attempted testamentary devise
and as such violates the statute of wills.
The Conclusions makes no reference as to the question of ''intent," ['The decree a\\·arded the $1,540.14, de])Osited \vith the Court, to be paid over to the Executrix,
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together with the title to a pontiac automobile and a
trailer.]
This appeal followed, and this Court affirined the
lower ·c·ourt.
[The foregoing facts are undisputed.
The lower ·Court, and this Court based its decision
entirely on the testimony of the son.
There was no evidence of fraud, Inistake, undue influence; nor \Vas there any evidence presented of inequitable conduct on the part of the son.
This Court in its opinion stated: "It is to be kept
in n1ind that if the transfer of ownership of this account, if any there was, was intended to vest only upon
the father's death, that \Yould be an attempted testamentary disposition, which did not conform to the requisites
for a \Yill, and would therefor be invalid to transfer
ownership as the trial Court ruled.
The Court quotes from Judge ·Cordozo quoting from
a former decision. The Court failed to add further statement of ·Cordozo, that "This presumption, injected by
Courts of equity since ancient times, continues and can
be overcome by the intervener only by clear and convincing proof to the contrary" (Tangren case - 1>agP
181). The Court then said "The critical question confronted here is whether the trial Court's finding that
the parties did not intend the son Douglas to own any
interest in the account prior to the father's death i~
supported by that degree of proof."]

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

[To sustain this findings of the lo\vc~r Court, thi:-;
Court recites (1) The father established the account, (:~)
1nade all deposits and \vithdrR\\yals, (3) Douglas the son,
made no deposits or withdra\vals, (-i-) The son 1nakes
no claim that his money \vent into the account, (5) Aft<~r
quoting from the son's testimony, this ·Court concluded
the foregoing was sufficient to overcome presu1nption
of validity of written agreement, by clear and convincing proof. And finally the Court said they 1nust favor
the lower Courts findings, and proceeded to affirm.
In support of our petition for rehearing, these
points should be reconsidered:
1. What proof is required to constitute ~'·C·LE.AR
AND CONVINCING P'R.OOF," sufficient to void a written instrument~
2. Is the intent of donee, under joint share agreenlent, alone, sufficient to determine the intent of Donor,
assuming no inequitable conduct on the part of donee~

3. Does the provision for survivorship, coupled
\vith the fact that donee did not, and had no intention
of using the account, during Donor's lifetime, violate the
statute of wills, and void the joint share agreement~
4. Is there a responsibility on this ·Court, ·where
facts are undisputed, to make its o\vn "findings of fact''
pointing out the basis for the same.
5. This decision goes in direct conflict \vith long
established business practice, and in conflict \vth legis-
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lative directive (7-13-39) that the opening of an account,
as outlined, shall be "CONCL USI\TE."
6. Practically every credit union account comes
\rithin the province of this case, and opens the door to
litigation.
POINT ONE
WHAT PROOF IS REQUIRED TO CONSTITUTE
"CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF," SUFFICIENT
TO VOID A WRITTEN INSTRUMENT?

The definitions we have found of this type of proof,
"\Vere not too helpful, and so, \Ve propose a revie\v of
some of the joint aecount cases, decided by this ·C·ourt,
in an atte1npt to see "That constituted CLEAR AND
CONVIN·CING PROOF.
HOLT VS. BAY·LESS, 85 Utah 364, 39 Pacific
Second 715. Decided December 28, 193-4.
In this case, donor made all deposits, donee made no
"\vithdrawals or deposits, donee said "It was Aunt Emma's money" and donee thought she was to get Inoney
when "Aunt Emma died." There was a subsequent will
by donor, with no mention of account. Till the Tangren
case, this was considered the law.
The donee did not exercise control, nor did she intend to until after death of donor.
The facts are identical with our case, but the Court
said the evidence did not meet the requi reinent of clear
and convincing proof.
The trust agreement was sustained. Under our case,
it \vould have been reversed.
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The intent of donee, nor the question of testaniPl1tary disposition, \vas not discussed.
Lawyers, basing their advice on that decision would
have been on reasonably safe ground, in advising joint
savings account, in lieu of wills.
The ·Court made extensive report of facts, and the
reason for its findings.
WOOD VS. KIN·TNER, 86 Utah 279, 43 Pacific
Second 192. Decided April 5, 1935.
In this case, fraud was claimed. The donor created
the account, furnished all they money, the donee \vas a
friend, not a relative, she deposited nothing, withdrew
nothing, exercised no control.
The Court, after extensive review of the facts, found
the burden was not met, and approved the joint account
in survivor. This case likewise would have come into the
preview of our case and been reversed.
NEIL \TS. ROYCE, 101 Utah 181, 120 Pacific
Second 327. Decided December 29, 19·41.
Here both parties \Yere alive. The money belonged
to husband. Wife made no deposits. Husband gave wife
account book, and she said, "I won't touch it." Claim
\Vas that the account vvas set up to avoid probate. This
is the nearest the Court previously considered an atteinpted testamentary disposition, but did not consider
it in that light, as effecting their decision.
In discussing ~'clear and sufficient proof" the 'Court
at page 331, said, "The only evidence refuting the im-
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plied joint savings account in the instant case was that
of the testin1ony of the co-depositors to the effect that
their purpose in establishing the joint savings account
,yas to take advantage of the survivorship provision, and
that the money was intended to be the sole and separate
property of the intervenor. Such proof under the circumstances of this case cannot be ter1ned so clear and
convincing as to require the trial court to find in favor
of appellant. To say that it was sufficient would throw
open the door to fraud and colusion as between codepositors and third parties. This equity will not do."
Here, both parties to the trust account said it was
the propPrty of husband, that the wife did not intend to
touch it, and that it was Inade only for the purpose of
avoiding probate.
Under our case, this one would have been reversed
both as to intent, and by reason by an attempted testaInentary disposition. The written agreement was sustained.

GREENER VS. G-REENER, 116 Utah 571, 212
Pacific Second 194. Decided December 2,
1949.

In this case the 1noney belonged to husband. They
made a tour of savings account institutions, and chang-<·d
the accounts to both thej r na1nes. They separated and
then effected a reconciliation. Again they signed j.o int
account cards. The husband withdrew 20,000.00 and put
it in his sons name. She then sued for divorcP and
claimed half of these joint accountH.
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Here the Court sustained the lo\ver ·Court in its findings there was no intent to creatP a joint account, and
here was a very substantial reason, he withdrew all the
Inoney and closed the account.
Had the father done so in our case, this case would
never have been instituted.
The fact that the father did not vvithdra\v the Inonp:,·,
nor change the account card, \vould be an indication or
evidence of his intent in setting up the account.
The lower Court held that there was clear and convincing proof against presumption of joint tenancy, and
that the account 'vas created to avoid probate. The lower
Court made an extensive memorandum to support these
findings. This Court spent ten pages reviewing the evidence and the findings and memorandum of the lower
c·ourt, before agreeing there was clear and convincing
evidence to set aside the written documents. They did
not include as their reason that it was an attempted
testamentary disposition.
This case indicates the care taken to review the
facts before holding a written agreement would be set
aside.
The striking point in this case is that the husband
\\·ithdrew all the money in his lifetime. A pretty strong
indication of his intent.
FIRST S·ECl1 RITY BANK OF UTAH, as EXE~c·UTOR VS. DE~1IRIS, 10 Utah Second 405,
354 Pacific Second 97. Decided July 7, 1960.
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In this case, the monies were property of husband.
lie had purchased bonds in the name of him and wife,
and opened savings accounts in his name and that of
his wife. These were of long standing. They had been
1narried 31 years but estranged over the last fifteen
years. Husband \Yas ill with cancer, and a month and
one half before his death, he changed his own account
by adding the wife's name. She immediately withdrew
the 1noney in all the accounts and put it in her name.
The husband made a will giving his brothers a substantial share of his estate. The lower 'Court ruled the
bonds and the long standing joint accounts went to the
wife, because of the time element. The recent account
did not, because that was not his intent. This Court
supported that decision, indicating that the account was
set up for convenience because of illness, and her imInediate withdrawal indicated her intent when she signed
the card.
There was pretty strong evidence as to both of their
intentions in setting up the last account. It is interesting
to note, that they did not similarly rule as to the old
accounts and the bonds.
Judge Crockett, at page 99, said in relation to the
v¥ife, withdrawing the account." Looking at the matter
through the eyes of equity it seems undisputable that
Defendant's act of grabbing the money at the earliest
opportunity was for the purpose of getting it for herself
and excluding the cotenant therefrom; and that this was
a 'vrongful act which should not be rewarded."
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I insert the above as an indication of the Courts
position, before overturning the joint account.
Even then, the Court did not change the written
instrument so far as the old accounts and bonds ·were
concerned.
In our case, the son exercised no control and Inade
no withdrawals, which indicated his intent as to the aecount: In the Demiris case, the withdrawal indicated
her intent not to create a joint account.
Would Ellett's ruling had been different if the son
had exercised control, and drawn out all the money in
the account~
0. A. 'TANGREN VS. ADALINE M. INGALLS,
12 Utah Second 388, 367 Pacific Second 179.
Decided November 30, 1961.
This case of course set up the proposition that the
intent in creating the account, was controlling.
It does not pinpoint ''Those intent, Donor, or donee,
but it did require donor, "\Vho desired to set aside written
instrument, to show his intent by clear and convincing
proof.
Donor had two building and loan accounts in his
own name. Ten months prior to his death, he included
Donee's name on accounts. During his lifetime he instituted suit to have accounts declared his o\vn, but died
five days after suit filed, and his Executor took over,
clai1ning ( 1) Money all Donor's, ( 2) Donee contributed
nothing to the account, ( 3) Donor \vas not indebted to
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Donee; (4) Donor later gave Donee $4,000.00 as her
share of his estate, ( 5) Donor vvas not R\vare of \vhat he
vvas doing in signing the joint account card.
Judge Faux ruled in lo\ver Court by way of surnInary judgment, that the joint account should stand.
This ·Court said Donor should have had the opportunity to present evidence in support of the above points,
and by inference indicated that if clear and convincing
proof were given, the vvritten agreement could be voided.
A major factor in his case, going to show intent of
donor \vas the giving of $4,000.00 as Donee's share of
his estate.
Another major point was that in his lifetime, Donor
filed suit to set aside account.
Neither of these points are present in our case.
BRAEGGER VS. LOVELAND, 12 Utah Seeond
384, 367 Pacific Second 177. Decided December 1, 19·61.
Donor was a bachelor, seventy years of age and
suffering from cancer. He had a bank account of $45,000.00. Two months before his death he put his sisters
name on the account. Before his death she withdrew the
1noney and put it in her own account. His Administrator
claimed the account. The lower Court gave each one-half.
This Court sustained the validity of the account,
saying her withdrawal of the account during donor's
lifetjme was practically the only fact the Administrator
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could point to, to upset the joint account. This Court
said this was not enough.
The Court did review the evidence and make its
own findings.
This case does hold that a withdrawal by one
joint tenant does not autoinatically destroy the joint
tenancy. Does the fact that Donee neither exercised
control, nor intended to, constitute clear and convincing
evidence sufficient to set aside the 'vritten instrument ·j?
This case is strong authority for the proposition,
that "The burden was not upon the Defendant to 1nake
an affirmative sho,ving of such intent. As the survivor
she was presumed to be the owner and the burden of
attacking her ownership was upon the Plaintiff AdIninistrator."
In support of its own "findings" the ·Court points
out, affection between brother and sister, her care of
deceased, and his expression to another, the account
'.vould go to the Donee.
All these elements are present in our case, father
and son relationship, the son caring for father's children, the father expressing his desire that "the boys be
taken care of."
HAYWARD 'TS. GII~L, 16 Utah Second 299, 400
P'acific Second 16. Decided ~larch 18, 1H65.
In this case a daughter moved in and cared for her
father '.vhen he \\?as 82 years of age. He died five years
later. He went to lawyer and had dee dra"\vn in favor of
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danghtL~r,

reserving life estate, and placed daughters
na1ne on 1,350.00 account.
Jiis estate clain1ed the account and attempted to void
the deed.
She never contributed to the account, exercised no
control, the father in five year period never changed the
account or expressed dissatisfaction.
,Judge Hanson dismissed Plaintiffs complaint. This
Court after reviewing the evidence confirmed this action.
11he Court said that the fact the daughter did not

contribute "any money in this account is not of controlling significance." Here again the Court said the
Plaintiff had the burden of proof. There was no mention of Donee's intent.
There was nothing said about an attempted testalllentary disvositio_n. Here again the Court made its own
findings.
Similarity to our case, are father and son relation,
the son caring for minor children, no dissatisfaction or
change in the account in three years, no deposits, withdra\\'al or control by donee.
Under Judge Elletts ruling, this case would have
been decided in favor of the estate.
From the foregoing review of ea~<~~, this ~lutunarv
seems fair; In sjx of these eight casPs, 01P (~on rt sustained thP written instrument.
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In the De1niris case th(~ Court sustained the agT('<'rnent as to the old accounts.
In the Den1iris case the ·Court found the joint atcount -vvould not stand up as to the' ne\\T account hPean~:w
of illness of Donor, her intention indicated llv iillllH'cliate withdrawal of the account, and the conduct of donpe
being inequitable.
The Court did support the agree1nent as to the old
accounts.
The Greene case was one where the account was
not sustained.
The Court pointed out marital difficulties, that he
withdrew all the monies in his lifetime.
We sub1nit that none of the elements for voiding
the agreement given in the Demiris or Greene case are
present in our case. Not one of the foregoing cases went
into the question of an attempted testamentary devise.
In each and every case this Court carefully set out
its own reasons for its conclusions, and nowhere is there
indicated that the lower Court ruling should be given
controlling consideration.
POINT TWO
IS THE INTENT OF DONEE ALONE, SUFFICIENT TO DETERMINE THE INTENT OF DONOR,
ASSUMING NO INEQUITABLE CONDUCT ON
PART OF DONOR?

We point out to the c·ourt that Judge Elletts ruling
as to intent is based exclusively on the testimony of
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Donl\e, and the opinion is this case says: "On the basis
of ·Clai1nant's own testiinony it seems incontestable that
the trial court could reasonably find as it did, that
neither he nor his father intended that he should have
an interest in this bank account \vhile his father lived."
Tht\re is not one statement in this record from the
fath( l' hirnself indicating his negative intent.
1

vV e do

not dispute the Courts findings that the son
had no intention of exercising control during the fathers
lifetime.
\Ve do raise this question, can that fact alone, without a single inequitable act on the part of the son, destroy
the written contract~
If we get our feet back on the ground, we will face
the fact, that a very substantial amount of savings accounts held in joint tenancy, are set up under exactly
the facts of this case.
This Court quotes the sons staternent to establish
the sons intent, and then attributes that to <lstablish thP
fathers intent.
We contend that since it was the fath<·rs InonPy, it
was his acts that created the account, it should hP hi::;
clear intent that should govern, and the clear edi<'t <)f
the written agreement should be carri<·d out.
The intent of donee should be given weight only
·when it is accompanied h,v inequitable conduct on the
part of donee, as Judge Crockett pointPd out in t hP
Demiris case.
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In the Holt vs. Bayl~ss case the Court said "ThP
controlling question is whether THE P'ERSO·N O·PENING THE A'CiCOUNT intentionally and intelligently
created a condition embracing the essPntial ele1nents of
joint ownership and survivorship."
In the Neil vs. Royce case, when the \vife was given
the account book, she said "I "\\rill never touch th<~ account." She never did. Yet the Court sustained the
agreement.
In the Greene case at page 199, the Court said "The
most widely accepted view is that the property passes
as a gift inter vivos provided there is a donative intent ... "
In making a gift, does not the intent of donor control~

If A makes a gift to B, who in turns thro,vs it in the
garbage can, does than void the gift to B ~
The facts in this case to show the fathers intent are
that, (1) he picked up the card, ( 2) he asked the son to
sign, (3) he had been a mernber of the credit union a
long time, he could read and write, and presumably knew
what he \Vas doing, ( 4) he delivered the card to the
credit union, ('5) he never changed the card, (6) his wife
asked that he change the card, but he never did, and (7)
he said he wan ted "the boys provided and taken care of."
Now, the lo,ver Court and this Court says he did not
intend what the card said, ''The joint o'vners of this
account hereby agree with each other and 'vith said credit
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union that all sums no\v paid on shares, or heretofore
or hereafter paid in on shares by any or all of said joint
O\\·ners to their credit as such joint o-vvners with all accurnulations thereon, are and shall be owned by them
jointly, -vvith right of survivorship and be subject to the
\\·ithdra\val or receipt of any of thern, and payment to
any of thern or the survivor or survivors shall be
1 . . ."
vaI'd
\Ve submit, the father intended to do exactly \vhat
that card said, and the sons intentions as to what he
\rould do with the right so besto,\·ed, should not void
that \vritten contract.
POINT THREE
DOES THE PROVISION FOR SURVIVORSHIP,
COUPLED WITH THE FACT THAT DONEE DID
NOT, AND HAD NO INTENTION TO USE THE
ACCOUNT, DURING THE LIFETIME OF DONOR,
VIOLATE THE STATUTE OF WILLS, AND VOID
THE JOINT SHARE AGREEMENT?

Admittedly this is a new point injected into the
already confused status of joint accounts.
None of the cases reviewed above, considered
point, or determined the point.

thi~

In the present case Judge Ellett in his "findings"
(8) "The Court further finds as a fact that there was
no joint tenancy created between Douglas K. Culle~r and
Virgil J. ·Culley by reason of the joint share agree1nent
and that said joint shan~ agreement was signed and
1nade for the sole purpose of being used as a substitute
for a will."
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( 9) "The Court further finds and the evidence
conclusively shows that the joint share agreement was
established by Douglas K. Culley and \'"irgil ~J. Culley
for the sole purpose and "rith the intention that Douglas
K. Culley, as the survivor, should have the remaining
balance at the tirne of \Tirgil J. Culleys death."
(10) "The ·Court finds as a fact that the joint share
agreement violates the statute of \Vilis and that under
the undisputed testimony of Douglas K. Culley the joint
share agreement WaS established by \Tirgil J. c·ulley and
Douglas K. Culley as a testamentary devise."

The lower Courts conclusions : (1) "That the joint
share agreement which was made and entered into by
Douglas K. Culley and Virgil J. Culley on March 10,
1960, was an attempted testamentary devise and as such
violates the statute of wills.''
Incidently, there \Yas not once 1nentioned in the trial
anything about \Vilis. Does the review by this Court
sho\v there was clear and convincing evidence as to this
"finding"~

The lower ·C·ourts conclusions of la\Y are limited to
( 1) above as to its being an atten1pted testamentary devise. There are no conclusions as to intent.
The decree is based on these findings and conclusions, and 1nakes no reference to either intent or atteulpted will.
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Does Judge Ellt tt base his decision exclusively on
the findings and conclusions, as to a testamentary de1

vise~

This Court, in approving of Judge Ellets decision
said, "It is to be kept in mind that if the transfer of
ownership of this account, if any there was, was intended to vest only upon the father's death, that would
be an attempted testa1nentary disposition which did not
conform to the requisites for a will, and would therefor
be invalid to transfer ownership as the trial Court ruled."
Again, '~The critical question confronted here is
''Thether the trial ·Court's finding that the parties did
not intend the son Douglas to o'vn any interest in the
account prior to the father's death is supported by that
degree of proof."
This Court then quotes from Respondent's brief as
to testimony of the son, and based on that excerpt, said,
"On the basis of Claimant's own testimony it seems
incontestable that the trial Court could reasonably find
as it did, that neither he nor his father intended that hP
should have any interest in this bank account while his
father lived."
Every joint account card I have ever read, provides
for survivorship. Now we have in this case, the situation
of testamentary devise, as an additional factor for the
Courts to consider, in arriving at the intent of the creator of the account, so as to determine if the written
agreement shall be set aside by clear and convincing
evidence.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
Every bank, building and loan association and credit
union, prepares cards for their depositors with ahnost
identical provisions. They urge, and alrnost insist that
their depositors have another nan1e on the card, to avoid
probate, and facilitate payment.
This Courts ruling in this case stands for the proposition, that if the donee, not donor, had no intention to
exercise control over the account until death of donor,
then the joint share agreement is void.
Does that not end the

matter~

What does injecting the question of testamentary
disposition into the case, do other than add to the confusion~

7-13-39 U.C.A. 1953 ( Supp. 1961) provides, after
setting out how the account shall be set up, "The opening of the account IN SUCH FORM shall in the absence
of fraud, or undue influence, be CONC'LUSIVE EVIDENCE in any action or proceedings to which either
the association or the surviving party or parties is a
party, of the intention of all the parties to the account
to vest to such account and the additions thereto in such
survivor or survivors.''

Does a decision by Judge Ellett and by this Court
deter1nining that the joint share agreement was not
drawn "in such forn1'' do away with the intent of the
legislature as above set out.
Is the provision of this statute contingent on the
joint share agree1nent being found by the ·Court to be
proper in form 1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
Assu1ning the Credit Union had paid over to the
son the rnoney in the account, and the ·Court finds that
the agreernent was void, is the credit union liable to the
l~~tate for paying out on a agreement the Court declared
void~

It \vould seem to Appellant, that inserting the matter of an attempted testamentary disposition, only adds
to the confusion presently existing in relation to joint
savings accounts.
POINT FOUR
WHERE FACTS ARE DISPUTED., IS THERE A
DUTY OF THE PART OF THIS COURT TO MAKE
ITS OWN FINDINGS OF FACT?

This Court in its opinion said, "We recognize that
fron1 the recital of joint ovvnership with the right of
survivorship there arises a presumption that such is
the fact. But it is, of course, not absolute and invunerable to attack. This is true even of deeds and other
\Vritten instruments."
"On the basis of Claimant's own testimony it seems
incontestable that the trial court could REASONABLY
find as it did, that neither he nor his father intended
that he should have any interest in this bank account
\vhile his father lived. AS IN OTHER MATTERS O·F
PROOF, WHETHER THE EVIDEN·CE IS SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE NECESSARY REQUli{.E~IENTS OF BEING CI~EAR AND CONVINCINU IS
LARGELY FOR THE TRIAL ·COUR.T TO DETER.~IIXE BECAUSE OF HIS ADVANTAGED P'OSI-
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TION. UNDER THE TRADITIONAL RT~IjES OF Rg_
VIEW, WHICH REQUIRES US TO SlTR,TEY THE
EVIDENCE AND ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN THEREFROM IN THE
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE T·RIAL
COURT'S FINDINGS, WE ·CAN SEE NO BASIS FOR
REVERSING THE JUDGMENT."
In our case there is no conflict in the evidence.
In all the cases referred to above this ·Court in review has extensively reviewed the lower Courts findings
as to clear and convincing proof, whether they affirmed
or reversed.
There is no basis for the lower Courts findings as
to the fathers intent, except the testimony of the son.
There was no pleadings, no evidence, for the lower
Courts findings and conclusions as to testamentary disposition.
Should not this ·Court have made its own determination as to the fathers intent, as indicated by the decision
in the Greene case, at page 202, "There are cases in
,,~hich we may be equally as good a position as the trial
court to make the inferences from what are usually called
basic, evidenciary, or underlying facts.
For instance where all the evidence is documentary.
. . . "Or where there are no issues concerning it in which
the creditability of the witness could play a part.. · ·
W <-' ''Tould be in as good a position as the trial Court
to 1nal\:e inferences and deductions from the evidence."
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.J..t\.gain in the De1niris case at page 99, this Court
said, ""It is our prerogative and DUTY under the con~titution to revie\v the evidence in equity cases and to
1nodify or rnake ne\v findings if the record compels it."
This is the case \\"here Judge Ellett, sitting as a
1nernber of the Court. dissented, and spent substantial
tin1e supporting his position at (Page 104) '~I am apposed to this Court becorning a trier of facts. It should
confine its efforts to a revie\Y of the alleged errors of
la,,· and to a passing upon facts in equity cases only
\vhen it is in the same position as is the district Court
judge, viz., ,,,.hen the facts are established by docunlentary evidence only."
Did this ·Court lend too rnuch \\·eight to the lo\ver
Courts findings, rather than makes its own determination~

In our case the joint agreement is docurnentary, the
exhibits deposited by the credit union are docurnentary,
the \vill is documentary, the testimony of the son is undisputed, his creditability is certainly not in issue, since
he testified to his own disadvantage.
We subrnit, the Court should start \vi.th a clean shPPt,
and from the record, make its own determjnation as to
"clear ond convincing proof," rather than exa1nining th<'
facts "in a light most favorable to the trial Court's findings."
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POINT FIVE
THIS DECISION IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT
WITH THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT AS EXPRESSED
IN 7-13-39 U.C.A. (Supp. 1961), AND LONG ESTABLISHED BUSINESS PRACTICE.

As heretofore stated, the joint account cards used
by banks, building and loan associations, credit unions,
and other saving institutions are almost identical, and
prepared meticulously by their legal advisers.
Every one of these urge their depositors to add an
additional name to their account.
For years I have advised and urged clients to 1nake
these joint accounts, "\\7ith provision for survivorship,
make joint tenancy deeds, putting stocks and bonds in
joint names, with right of survivorship, and also advising that then no probate is necessary, nor is a will
required.
If I interpret the Courts decision correctly, after
the death of the donor of the account, if his estate can
show that the donee did not intend to exercise control
over the account, till after the donors death, the joint
account is void, and they money goes to the estate, resulting in probate.
I submit that each member of this Court is fully
aware of the business practice of adding a name to an
account, with the absolute intention (1) for donor toretain control during life, (2) to provide for the funds
being available in e1nergency or illness; and finally (3)
the fund go to donee on death, \Vi thout the expense of
probate.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27

This I subn1it is do\vn to earth actual business practic e.
This decision puts an end to that practice.
As legal advisor to a savings institution, could he
advise the bank to pay to the survivor, on the basis that
the statute quoted heretofore would protect the bank.
Would not his advice be more in keeping with this
decision if he said "Deposit it with the ·Court, and let
the heirs and survivor, fight it out."
POINT SIX
UNDER THE HOLDING IN THIS CASE, ALM 0 S T EVERY CREDIT UNION ACCOUNT IS
VUNERABLE.

Limiting our discussion to the Garfield SmelterInen's Credit Union. There are in excess of one thousand
employees at the smelter. A substantial majority of
these belong to the credit union. All are urged to take
home a card and have a wife, brother, son, daughter,
parent, friend or relative sign.
Membership in the credit union by state law and the
credit union by-la-vvs limit membership to employees.
Practically every account makes deposits by payroll
deduction.
The donor, not the donee makes this arrangernent
for payroll payment.
The credit union office is inside the gates of the
sn1elter. Only employees have free access. Donees sel-
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dom if ever go to the office. Certainly donee makes no
deposit to the account.
The donor exclusively controls the account in his
lifetime, both as to deposits and \Vithdrawals.
If he wants to eliminate the donee, he simply withdraws all money on deposit, the donee neither signs for
vvithdrawal or is notified.
This gentlemen, is actually ''That happens in the vast
rnaj.ority of cases.
Douglas K. Culley, the son, testified to the exact
nature of his relation to the account.
Practically every other donee, whether wife, brother,
sister, or friend, would testify exactly as did Douglas K.
..Culley.
Under this decision, a substantial majority of the
savings accounts in the Garfield Srneltermen 's Credit
Union, would be in exactly the sarne position as the
account in this case.
I assume this ·Court is not so gullible as to believe
brotherly love \Vould predominate, over the heirs possibly getting a cut of the saving account as such heir.
I think it is a fair conclusion that this ruling will
result in a substantial increase in probate proceedings,
follo\\"ed by litigation between the estate, the survivor
and the credit union, savings and loan association and
banks.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29

The vie"\\r expressed by Judge Henriod in the Tangren vs. Ingalls case is ahnost prophetic, ''Then he said
at page 186, ''This case has upsidedo"\\ ned the law on
joints accounts. 1\{ost certainly it will require banks and
depositors to change their ways, to what extent it is
difficult to anticipate. This case will bring more than
one client into the advocates office to inquire: Why did
you tell 1ne that our joint account 'vould eliminate the
necessity of making a vvill, and would save 1ne the costs
of probate ... " That has already been my experience.
7

For thirty years I have urged my people to make
these joint accounts, in lieu of a will and expense of
probate.
Lee Cummings was nice enough to send me extra
copies of the "green sheet'' in this case, which I for'varded to the ·Culley boys and the treasurer of the
smelter credit union.
Based on telephone calls, personal contacts, and
overheard comments, this community is much disturbed.
To those who have consulted me since the opinion,
I have no answer that satisfies them or me.
If 1ny version of the decision, as set out herein, is
in error, then I would be happy and delighted to he so
enlightened.
If my version is correct, then this Court should, if
it still sustains Judge Ellett, set it out in no uncertain
terms.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

30
In shop.-talk with other attorneys, their conePrn is
the same as mine herein expressed.
This Court could render a great service to both
savings institutions, the legal profession and to deposi-. t.ors, by once and for all clearing the confusion heretofore existing as to savings accounts held jointly, and
particularly clarify this last decision.

CON·OL USIONS
1. There is no clear and convincing proof, sufficient
to set aside and void the joint share agreement.
2. Absent misconduct on part of donee, his intent
in setting up the joint account, is not alone, sufficient
to void joint account.
3. The question of attempted testamentary disposition should not be added to matters to be considered in
determining intent.
4. Where the evidence is documentary, and no conflict in oral testimony, this Court should makes its own
determination of intent and other issues.
5. The use of joint accounts, as done in this case,
to. avoid probate, is a long established business practice;
and \vhich is supported by legislative enactment.
6. This decision will be the basis for increased litigation that involve joint savings accounts.
Respectfully submitted,
Roy F. Tygesen - Attorney for
Douglas K. c·ulley (son) Interpleading
Plaintiff, appellant and petitioner for
rehearing.
2968 South 8650 West, Magna, Utah
P.O. Box 206- Dial 297-6711
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